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lative history or the structure of IGRA helps determine
which phrase to honor, and which to discard.
In some respects, lawyers are always complaining
about statutes' "making no sense," of course. For example, even if we know what Congress was getting at
in drafting an operative provision, perhaps Congress
didn't think about the specific situation we have to deal
with, and the well-intentioned statute leads to a result
we "know" Congress wouldn't have wanted. Or maybe
Congress mucked up the statutory language, putting
in a "not" where it obviously didn't belong, or crossreferencing "subsection (a)(3)" when it must have
meant "(a)(2)." Or maybe different provisions, enacted
at different times and with different congressional
goals, coexist in tension- something that happens all
the time with a complex statutory scheme that has
evolved over decades.

I

What should judicial interpreters do
when two simultaneously enacted
phrases are irreconcilable?

Cases like those aren't easy to handle, and interpreters won't agree on which interpretive principles
should control or how any particular principle ought
to apply. But at least we know how to talk about the
issues; we know the language to use. The discussion
will focus on matters such as plain meaning, the purpose behind the particular provision or provisions, the
larger structure in which the provisions reside, and so
on, and the goal will be to find a coherent meaning for
the relevant statutes.
Some of that happened in Chickasaw Nation~ five
of the seven justices in the majority struggled to discern
congressional intent from the legislative history5 - but
the difficulty was more fundamental. Saying that the
statute in Chickasaw Nation "makes no sense" isn't hyperbolic. With back-to-back phrases pointing in opposite directions, and with Congress's having left few
signals as to which path it intended to follow, the
statutory provision had' no plain meaning and no clear
purpose, and it was part of no otherwise coherent
statutory structure that pointed in one interpretive
direction. The statute was, quite simply, broken.
Although the situation in Chickasaw Nation was unusual, one hopes- with a single statutory provision,
enacted at a single time, so clearly botched - it illustrates what must be an increasing problem. There's
not much chance that the U.S. Code and state codes
will shrink in size and complexity, and the greater the
statutory volume, the more likely it is that blatant contradictions will occur.
What should judicial interpreters do when two
simultaneously enacted phrases are irreconcilable?
One possibility is the judicial ~quivalent of flipping a

5
Chickasaw Nation, 122 S. Ct. at 533-35. Justices Scalia and
Thomas didn't join the part of the opinion discussing legislative history, and the two dissenters, Justices O'Connor and
Souter, disagreed with the Court's reading of that history.
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coin, with a court's saying (or at least meaning) something like the following: "We don't know what the right
answer is (and the legislature obviously didn't know
either), but we have to decide, so we'll make a choice
as best we can. We're not talking constitutional law
here, and, if we've misunde~rstood what the legislature
meant, or would have meant if it had been paying
attention, the legislature can clean up the problem for
the future. In fact, even if we get it 'right,' in some
sense, the legislature should still clean up the statutory
language to avoid confusing others."
Coin-flipping may lack intellectual elegance, but it's
a perfectly respectable judicial procedure in limited
circumstances: when a court must deal with a hopelessly broken statute and it has nothing else to grab
ahold of. In ruling against the tribes in Chickasaw Nation, the Court (obviously) didn't say it was doing any
such thing; it referred to a tax canon, congressional
intent, and other plausible justifications for concluding
that the tribes were liable for the taxes. 6 But, to my
mind, this was a coin flip, and it wasn't an appropriate
case for a coin flip.
I'll argue that the Court had a cleaner way to resolve
the dispute in Chickasaw Nation, and to do so in a way
consistent with existing authority. Because of the
American Indian law character of the case, there was
a tie-breaking principle, derived from the so-called Indian canons of construction, that should have led to a
fairly clear result. And that result was the one
promoted by dissenting Justices Sandra Day O'Connor
and David H. Souter: Without a congressional statement to the contrary, the tribes should have been exempt from the excise and occupational taxes at issue
in the cases.
In Part I, I describe the IGRA language that gave rise
to the interpretive problem in Chickasaw Nation. In Part
II, I introduce the Indian canons of construction, which
I'll later argue (in Part IV) should have been used to
resolve the dispute. In Part III, I provide an executive
summary of the major points made by the majority and
the dissenters in Chickasaw Nation. Finally, in Part IV, I
question whether it was appropriate for the Court to
have discounted the significance of the Indian canons
in its decision, particularly in a case where, I'll argue,
there should have been no presumption that the tribes
would be subject to the wagering taxes.

I. The Broken Statutory Provision
Most of the high-profile legal issues that have arisen
under IGRA- having to do with the uneasy relationship between states and tribes in regulating gambling
in Indian country - aren't relevant for present purposes. What is relevant is one previously obscure passage in IGRA, codified at section 2719(d)(l) of Title 25:
The provisions of [the Internal Revenue Code of
1986] (including sections 1441, 3402(q), 6041, and
6050I, and chapter 35 of such Code) concerning
the reporting and withholding of taxes with
respect to the winnings from gaming or wagering

6

See infra Part III.A.
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operations shall apply to Indian gaming operations conducted pursuant to this chapter, or
under a Tribal-State compact entered into under
section 2710(d)(3) of this title that is in effect, in
the same manner as such provisions apply to
State gaming and wagering operations. 7
This language is definitely of the eyes-glazing-over
type. It's legalese at its worst, complete with a "concerning," a "with respect to," a "pursuant to," and the
rest of it- all in one sentence. 8 To figure out who has
to do what, we have to read all those mind-numbing
provisions in the Internal Revenue Code (sections 1441,
3402(q), etc.), and that's unpleasant. But it's the sort of
thing that readers of Tax Notes are trained to do, and it
can be done. Moreover, taken as a whole, the IGRA .
passage seems relatively straightforward: Tribes are to
be treated the same as states for certain purposes.

This language is definitely of the
eyes-glazing-over type. It's legalese at
its worst, complete with a
'concerning,' a 'with respect to,' a
'pursuant to,' and the rest of it - all in
one sentence.
Sections 1441, 3402(q), 6041, and 6050! all deal with
reporting or withholding. 9 If states have to report and
withhold when someone hits a state gambling jackpot
(which, in the state context, generally means a lottery
winner), then tribes should have to do so, too. 10 If states
don't have to report and withhold, then tribes
shouldn't have to either. Without getting into nittygritty details,, we can easily understand the general
principle: States and tribes must report and withhold

7

25 U.S.C. section 2719(d)(1). It's ironic, given the drafting
glitch at issue in Chickasaw Nation, that the majority's opinion,
as set out in the slip version and reprinted by the proprietary
services, cited to a nonexistent section 2719( d)(i) of IGRA,
rather than to 2719(d)(1). (The dissenting justices simply cited
to 2719(d).) I can find no explanation for this except inadvertence. In the Court's defense, I should note that the citation
mistake shouldn't cause any substantive confusion (although
it wasted a few minutes of my time).
8
Those of you old enough to remember the practice should
try diagramming the sentence.
9
Section 1441 provides, in general, for withholding of tax
on certain payments to nonresident aliens. Section 3402(q)
provides for withholding on certain gambling winnings. Section 6041 imposes reporting obligations on payors for certain
payments exceeding $600. And section 60501 imposes certain
reporting obligations in connection with ca?h received in
amounts greater than $10,000. Section references are to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, except as otherwise noted.
10
Imposing these requirements on states and tribes may
be an imposition on sovereign or quasi-sovereign bodies, but
the purpose of reporting and withholding is perfectly appropriate: to prevent gambling winners, people like you or
me (more likely you), from escaping income tax liability.

TAX NOTES, December 2, 2002

for bigger awards in high-risk games, and in some
other circumstances as well. 11
So far, so good. The problem with the IGRA provision, however- the reason it doesn't work- is the
reference to "chapter 35 of such Code," included in the
same parenthetical as the cross-referenced reporting
and withholding sections. Chapter 35 has nothing to
do with reporting and withholding. It imposes taxes
on those who conduct certain gambling operations the chapter is titled "taxes on wagering"- with some
specific exemptions, including one for state-conducted
lotteries.
l)nder chapter 35, section 4401 imposes "on any
wager authorized under the law of the State in which
accepted an excise tax equal to 0.25 percent of the
amount of such wager." 12 Section 4402 then generally
exempts "state-conducted lotteries" from the excise. 13
Section 4411 imposes a "special tax of $500 per year to
be paid by each person who is liable for the tax imposed under section 4401," 14 but, because of section
4402, the occupational tax wouldn't apply to a state
that conducts a "state-conducted lottery." Nothing is
said in chapter 35 about the liability of American Indian tribes one way or the other.
The two key phrases in IGRA section 2719(d)(1) are
thus "chapter 35 of such Code" and "concerning the
reporting and withholding of taxes," and the statute is
written as if the former were an example of the latter.
But it's not. Either the reference to chapter 35 doesn't
belong in the. parenthetical, or, if it does belong, the
phrase "reporting and withholding obligations" is an
incomplete description of what the provision applies
to. As it is, section 2719(d)(1) is garbled.
All of which leads to the particular question in Chickasaw Nation. Since states generally don't have to pay
"taxes on wagering" on their lotteries, did Congress
mean, by referring to "chapter 35," that tribes should
also be exempt from those taxes? (If the reference in
IGRA to "chapter 35" means anything at all - which,
to be sure, isn't clear - it presumably means that. )15
Or did Congress intend, with the reference to "reporting and withholding of taxes," to exempt tribes from
certain reporting and withholding obligations and
nothing else?

11

Withholding is required generally for winnings over
$5,000, if "the amount of such proceeds is at least 300 times
as large as the amount wagered." Section 3402( q)(3 ). The
statute excepts slot machines, keno, and bingo from the withholding obligations. Section 3402(q)(5).
12
Section 4401(a)(1).
13
Section 4402(3).
14
Section 4411(a).
15
Chapter 35 itself contains no mention of American Indian tribes. If tribes are exempt from the obligations under
chapter 35, it has to be because of the cross-reference in IGRA.
Section 7871 provides for treating Indian tribal governments
as states for certain purposes, such as the charitable contribution deduction and specified excise taxes, but none of the
listed purposes even arguably applies to wagering operations.
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Both possibilities can't be right. By its terms, the
statute is contradictory, and the legislative history is of
little help in explaining the meaning of the cryptic
reference to "chapter 35." Or perhaps it's the reference
to "reporting and withholding obligations" that's cryptic; maybe Congress really meant to exempt the tribes
from the wagering taxes but botched the rest of the
statute. The legislative history doesn't help much with
that question either. 16
Not surprisingly, both the tribes and the United
States wanted to rewrite the statute to give it coherence,
and that led to some pointed exchanges at oral argument. In a reply brief, and then at oral argument, the
tribes argued that the nonparenthetical language
should be reconceptualized to provide the same treatment for tribes as for states: "concerning (a) the reporting and withholding of taxes with respect to the winnings from gaming or (b) wagering operations." 17 Such
a reading, if accepted, would have given the tribes a
broad exemption from federal wagering taxes, just like
the states for their lotteries. 18 At oral argument, Justice
Antonin Scalia responded: "This meaning didn't occur
to you till the reply brief? That suggests how implausible it is." 19 In his view, "[t]he Indians' interpretation is strained." 2 0
Strained, yes, but the tribes weren't making up the
reference to "chapter 35." It's in the statute, and
statutory language generally ought to be treated as if
it means something. The government lawyer, who argued that the reference to chapter 35 had no effect on
tribal immunity from taxation, was asked by Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg "to concede that ... the only way
to make sense of the statute is to treat it as if the
reference to chapter 35 were not there." 21 He made the
concession, stating that he couldn't provide a good
reason for "chapter 35's" being in the parenthetical. 22
At bottom, therefore, the government's position was
that "chapter 35" should effectively be deleted in read-

16
Five members of the majority in Chickasaw Nation purported to derive help from the legislative history of IGRA, see
infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text, but the two dissenters questioned the majority's reading of that history. See
infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
17
See Reply Brief for Petitioners at 8-10, Chickasaw Nation
v. United States, 122 S. Ct. 528 (2001) (No. 00-507); Chickasaw
Nation, 122 S. Ct. at 533.
18
Two other interpretational issues can arise under chapter
35: What constitutes a "wager" for purposes of determining
whether the excise tax potentially applies, and what constitutes a "lottery" potentially eligible for the exemption for
"state-conducted lotteries"? The government conceded in
Chickasaw Nation that the tribes' pull-tab games were "lotteries" for purposes of the statute, and therefore (depending
on the reading of the IGRA provision) potentially eligible for
an exemption.
19
Quoted in Carolyn Wright LaFon, "High Court Urged to
Adopt 'Strained' Interpretation of Poorly Drafted Statute,"
Tax Notes, Oct. 8, 2001, p. 186, at 187.
20
Quoted in id.
21
Transcript of Oral Argument (Oct. 2, 2001), Chickasaw
Nation v. United States, 122 S. Ct. 528 (2001) (No. 00-507).

22Jd.
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ing IGRA section 2719(d)(1),23 and doing that requires
some interpretive straining, too.
So that leaves us with the following situation: The
statute contains two phrases that have no apparent
way of being reconciled, aJ.!d one phrase or the other
will have to be changed substantially, maybe even disregarded, if anything approaching a coherent meaning
is to emerge. What goes and what stays?

II. The American Indian Canons of Construction
One set of interpretive principles with possible
relevance in a case like Chickasaw Nation is the so-called
canons of construction in American Indian law. 24 In
general, as the Supreme Court put it in 1930, in a somewhat condescending way, "doubtful expressions are to
be resolved in favor of the weak and defenseless people
who are the wards of the nation, dependent upon its
protection and good faith." 25

For a circuit court to have rejected the
canons in a summary fashion, as the
Tenth Circuit did, is almost
incomprehensible.

I

Although the canons were developed to interpret
nineteenth-century treaties between the United States
and the Indian tribes - the treaties were similar to
contracts of adhesion, and they contained decidedly
unusual language - the canons have been extended to
apply to statutes, executive orders, and regulations as
well. The canons are expressed in different terms in
different contexts, but, whatever the language used, the
canons encompass the following points: "(1) very
liberal construction to determine whether Indian rights
exist; and (2) very strict construction to determine
whether Indian rights are to be abridged or

23
The Tenth Circuit had suggested that the reference to
chapter 35 may have been intended to pick up the definitions
of "wager" and "lottery" from that chapter. Chickasaw Nation,
208 F.3d at 883. In its brief responding to the petition for
certiorari (and supporting the grant), the government also advanced that interpretation. Brief for the United States on Petition for Certiorari at 6, Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 122 S.
Ct. 528 (2001) (No. 00-507). In its brief on the merits, the United
States repeated that interpretation, but seemed to downplay
it. Brief for the United States at 14-15, Chickasaw Nation v.
United States, 122 S. Ct. 528 (2001) (No. 00-507). With the
concession at oral argument, the government apparently
abandoned the attempt to attach some meaning to the reference.
24
I've discussed the canons in these pages before. See Erik
M. Jensen, "American Indian Law Meets the Internal Revenue Code: Warbus v. Commissioner," Tax Notes, Apr. 5, 1999,
p. 105 (revised version of article originally published in 74
North Dakota Law Review 691 (1998)) [hereinafter Jensen, Warbus]; see also Erik M. Jensen, "American Indian Tribes and
401(k) Plans," Tax Notes, July 3, 1995, p. 117.
25
Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930).
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abrogated. " 26 This generally means that if there's doubt
about the interpretation of a provision, the doubt
should be resolved in favor of the affected tribes. 27
The application of the canons may not always be
clear, and judges have circumvented the canons by
purporting to find no ambiguity in inherently ambiguous documents. Even when that happens, however, judges typically write their opinions as if the
canons were being taken seriously28 - as well they
should be. The canons are part of the law; they aren't
supposed to be optional, to be applied only by tribefriendly courts.
In Chickasaw Nation, however, the Tenth Circuit in
one brief paragraph rejected using the canons of construction as aids in construing IGRA: There was no
ambiguity needing resolution, said the court, and
therefore no role to be played by the canons. 29 Perhaps
these weren't disputes for which the canons were appropriate, as the Supreme Court also ultimately
decided. I think both courts were wrong in that determination, as I'll discuss in Part IV, but at least the
Supreme Court grudgingly discussed the relevance of
the canons at length. 3 For a circuit court to have
rejected the canons in a summary fashion, however, as
the Tenth Circuit did, is almost incomprehensible. 31

°

III. The Supreme Court's Interpretation
All members of the Chickasaw Nation Court agreed
that something went wrong in drafting section
2719(d)(l) of IGRA- on that point, no reasonable person could disagree - and that something would therefore have to give in interpreting the statute. In this part

26
David H. Getches, et al., Federal Indian Law: Cases and
Materials 327 (4th ed. 1998).
27
I'm willing to go further: If there is significant doubt
about whether an ambiguity exists- if there is doubt about
whether there is doubt - the canons should be used to resolve that question. It's consistent with the canons as they
have developed to require courts to look for ways to interpret
controlling language in favor of an affected tribe or tribal
member.
28
See, e.g., County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands
of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 263 (1992) (applying
canons generously to forbid excise tax on sale of fee land
within reservation boundaries while generally downplaying
effect of canons in concluding that ad valorem tax on those
lands was permissible).
29
Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 880.
30
Given what the Court wound up saying about the
canons, however, maybe it would have been better if the
Court had ignored them. See infra Part IV.A.
31
It sometimes happens that a court is unaware of the
canons and the parties make no effort to educate the court.
(Sometimes the parties too are oblivious.) See Jensen, Warbus,
supra note 24 (discussing Tax Court case involving American
Indian law issues, in which Special Trial Judge wasn't advised of canons of construction). But the Tenth Circuit is the
second busiest American Indian law circuit in the nation,
behind only the Ninth Circuit, and Tenth Circuit judges are
used to discussing the canons as a matter of course.
Downplaying the canons, as the Tenth Circuit did in Chickasaw Nation, couldn't have been an accident.

TAX NOTES, December 2, 2002

of the article, I've provided an executive summary of
the big points made by the majority and the dissenters.
(I'll try to be balanced in my presentation, but it will
become apparent that I think the dissenters came much
closer to getting it right.)

A. Majority
The Court concluded that the statute shouldn't be
interpreted to exempt the tribes from the excise and
occupational taxes: "We agree with the Tribes that
rejecting their argument reduces the phrase 'including
... chapter 35) ... ' to surplusage. Nonetheless, we can
find no other reasonable reading of the statute." 32

The statutory glitch isn't an ambiguity; it's a mistake.
The statute gives a list of examples of reporting and
withholding provisions, and, wrote Justice Stephen G.
Breyer, '"chapter 35' is simply a bad example - an
example that Congress included inadvertently. The
presence of a bad example in a statute doesn't warrant
rewriting the remainder of the statute's language." 33
While courts ought to try to give effect to each word
in a statute "if possible," they can properly ignore
words that are surplusage - and fourth-tier
surplusage at that: "a numerical cross-reference in a
parenthetical. " 34

Parenthetical language isn't as important as nonparenthetical language. If parenthetical language appears to
conflict with another passage in a statute, it's the
parenthetical that should give way. The "language outside the parenthetical is unambiguous," Justice Breyer
wrote: 35 It's only the "reporting and withholding" rules
for which there should be tribal-state conformity. The
reference to "chapter 35" is merely in an illustrative
parenthetical, "hence redundant," 36 with no "independent operative effect." 37 To give "chapter 35" operative effect would require rewriting the statute in the
"strained" way urged by the tribes, 38 and that would
give the statute too broad a sweep.

32

Chickasaw Nation, 122 S. Ct. at 532.
Id. at 533.
34
In a passage that will have interpreters shaking their
heads in 50 years, Justice Breyer analogized the IGRA passage
to an instruction to "Test drive some cars, including
Plymouth, Nissan, Chevrolet, Ford, and Kitchenaid." Id.
35
Id. at 532.
36
Id. The government made the point in its brief. The reference to "chapter 35."
is merely one of a series of unexplained cross-references in an illustrative parenthetical. It cannot fairly be
said to contradict limitations that inhere in the provision's central textual command. That is particularly
true where the result that petitioners seek is a complete
exemption from two federal excise taxes that are wholly unrelated to the reporting and withholding provisions to which Section 2719(d) otherwise refers.
Brief for the United States at 7-8, Chickasaw Nation v. United
States, 122 S. Ct. 528 (2001) (No. 00-507).
37
Chickasaw Nation, 122 S. Ct. at 532.
38
See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text; Chickasaw
Nation, 122 S. Ct. at 533.
33
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The legislative history, while incomplete, does help in
interpretation. 39 Early drafts of what became IGRA
specifically provided for tribes to be treated like states
for purposes of both tax liability and reporting obligations.40 At those earlier times a parenthetical reference
to "chapter 35" would have made sense, but then the
language that would have explicitly exempted tribes
from tax liability was deleted. Extrapolating from the
evidence, Justice Breyer concluded that the deletion
was intentional - Congress didn't mean to exempt
tribes from wagering tax liability41 - and that the
parenthetical reference to chapter 35 survived only because of inadvertence. Breyer didn't know the sequence of events, since drafting was done in closeddoor sessions, but "[i]t is far easier to believe that the
drafters, having included the entire parenthetical while
the word 'taxation' was still part of the bill, unintentionally failed to remove what had become a superfluous numerical cross-reference." 42

In interpreting a statutory provision, a court should pay
little or no attention to what participants say in later years.
In a letter to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
written three years after IGRA' s enactment, Senator
Daniel Inouye had stated that "it was the intention of
the Congress that the tax treatment of wagers conducted by tribal governments be the same as that for
wagers conducted by state governments under Chapter 35." 43 Even though Inouye was the self-proclaimed
"primary author" of IGRA as chair of the Senate Select
Committee on Indian Affairs, Justice Breyer dismissed
the letter as reflecting after-the-fact views of one
Senator, who didn't explain the evolution of the
statutory language. 44

39

Justices Scalia and Thomas didn't sign on to the legislative history discussion.
40
The original Senate bill provided that
[p ]revisions of the Internal Revenue Code ... concerning the taxation and the reporting and withholding of
taxes with respect to gambling or wagering operations
shall apply to Indian gaming operations .... the same
as they apply to State operations.
S. Rep. No. 555, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1987), quoted in
Chickasaw Nation, 122 S. Ct. at 533.
41
Another possibility, however, is that the reference to
"taxation" was deleted because of tribal sensitivity. See infra
note 44.
42
Chickasaw Nation, 122 S. Ct. at 534. A contrary interpretation, wrote Justice Breyer, "would read back into the Act the
very word 'taxation' that the Senate committee deleted." Id.
43
Letter from Daniel Inouye to Fred T. Goldberg Jr. (Dec.
12, 1991), reprinted in Petition for Writ of Certiorari at app.
112a, 113a, Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 122 S. Ct. 528
(2001) (No. 00-507).
44
See Chickasaw Nation, 122 S. Ct. at 534. It may be that we
don't know the full legislative history because of turf battles
at the time. Kathleen Nilles, tax counsel to Ways and Means
from 1990 until1994 (i.e., after IGRA's enactment), thinks the
statute was garbled because of tensions between tax-writing
committees and the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs. See
LaFon, supra note 19, at 188. The reference to "taxation" in
the initial Senate version of the bill, see supra note 40, may
(Footnote 44 continued in next column.)
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A tax canon points to tribal taxability. A longstanding
canon of construction in tax law is that exemptions
should be narrowly construed: "When Congress enacts
a tax exemption, it ordinarily does so explicitly." 45 Unless Congress makes it _clear that a particular tax
doesn't apply to a particular legal person who would
otherwise be covered by the statute, the tax is deemed
to apply. Congress could have exempted American Indian tribes from the chapter 35 taxes, of course, but
nothing in IGRA evidenced an express congressional
intention to do so.
In light of the above, these weren't close cases to which
the American Indian canons should apply. I'll return to the
Indian canons later, in Part IV. Suffice it to say for now
that the Court concluded that Chickasaw Nation and
Choctaw Nation weren't cases in which it was appropriate to give the tribes the benefit of any doubt. In
fact, the Court concluded that these weren't doubtful
cases to begin with.

B. The Dissenters
In contrast, dissenting Justices O'Connor and Souter
thought that Chickasaw Nation and Choctaw Nation were
precisely the sorts of cases, chock-full of ambiguity, for
which the Indian canons were intended. And if the
canons applied, with doubts resolved in the tribes'
favor, the tribes should have been exempt from the
chapter 35 taxes.
Of course there's ambiguity in the IGRA provision. Section 2719(d), wrote Justice O'Connor, "is subject to
more than one interpretation" 46 - that's why there was
an issue for Supreme Court review - and, where I
come from, that's what ambiguity means. 47 If so, the
Court should have had to meet the ambiguities head
on, not pretend that the ambiguities don't exist.

There's ambiguity if only because we don't know which
of the two phrases came first and which was intended to have
primacy. Justice O'Connor said that the Court made the
have been deleted "in light of the extreme sensitivity of tribal
leaders to any suggestion that tribes as governments are subject to tax .... Unfortunately, the professional staff of the
Senate Finance Committee did not have an opportunity to
correct the Indian Affairs Committee's work." J. Christine
Harris, "Tribes Might Ask Congress to Clarify Intent, Based
on Chickasaw," Tax Notes, Dec. 3, 2001, p. 1262 (quoting Nilles). For what it's worth (nothing, the Court would say),
Nilles has said that
it is obvious to me that [section 2719(d)(1)] was intended to provide the same treatment of tribes and
states under the various code provisions relevant to
gaming winnings and gaming operations. That is,
where states are required to withhold and report on
certain types of gambling winnings paid out to
patrons, tribal governments have parallel obligations.
And, where states are exempt from certain taxes (e.g.,
states are exempt under a provision of chapter 35 from
the federal wagering excise tax), tribes are also exempt.
Quoted in LaFon, supra note 19, at 187-88.
45
Chickasaw Nation, 122 S. Ct. at 533.
46
Id. at 536 (O'Connor, L dissenting).
47
In our search for ambiguity, it should count for something that two smart justices, with their smart clerks, and a
panel of the Federal Circuit thought the statute doesn't mean
what the majority concluded it must mean.
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legislative history seem more straightforward than it
was. IGRA section 2719(d)(l) unquestionably contains
a mistake, and we can't tell from the face of the statute,
or from the legislative history, whether Congress erred
in including the reference to u chapter 35" in the parentheticat or whether the error was in not broadening
the phrase "reporting and withholding of taxes" to
encompass an exemption from wagering taxes. 48 Wrote
O'Connor: "If the parenthetical was added after the
restriction, one could just as easily characterize the
restriction as an unintentional holdover from a previous
verison of the bill." 49
The reference to "chapter 35" isn't surplusage. Surplusage
can be ignored, but, wrote Justice O'Connor, that's because "[s]urplusage is redundant statutory language."50 The reference to "chapter 35" isn't redundant, and it's not appropriate to ignore language just
because it complicates matters: "[T]he Court's reading
negates language that undeniably bears separate meaning."51 And, if it has meaning, the language points in
the direction of exemption from taxation.

Parenthetical language isn't necessarily subordinate to
nonparentheticallanguage. The dissenters were aware of
no canon that requires giving greater weight to language outside a parenthetical than to language inside
one. Justice O'Connor wrote, "The importance of
statutory language depends not on its punctuation, but
on its meaning." 5 2

Congressional policy cuts against the Court's conclusion.
Perhaps the dissenters' most telling point, apart from
the related argument about the Indian canons of construction, was the congressional policy behind IGRA.
As Justice O'Connor wrote, quoting from the statute,
"Congress' central purpose in enacting IGRA was 'to
provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming
by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal
governments."' 53 Interpreting IGRA section 2719(d)(l)
with that purpose in mind points toward tribal exemption from taxes, both because exemption would reduce
tribal tax bills and because it would prevent state lotteries from having a competitive advantage.

field for the Indian canons of construction. 54 And if the
canons had applied to resolve ambiguities in Chickasaw
Nation, they might very well have mandated a tribal
victory. That's the point of the canons, to serve as a
tiebreaker in favor of affected tribes in ambiguous
cases.

A. Was There an Ambiguity to Be Resolved?
To avoid giving decisive weight to the canons, the
Supreme Court therefore had to decide that Chickasaw
Nation wasn't a case involving ambiguity, and that's
just what the Court did. Despite the garbled statute,
the dissents of two members of the Court, and a Federal
Circuit decision to the contrary, the majority concluded
that "we cannot say that the statute is 'fairly capable'
of two interpretations." 55 That statement boggles my
mind, but a conclusion that there's no ambiguity at
least provides an explanation, consistent with existing
law, as to why the canons weren't to be given weight
in Chickasaw Nation: no ambiguity, no need for canons.
The Court didn't just stop at the no-ambiguity point,
however. It also threw in some gratuitously disparaging comments about the canons, and, for tribal
proponents, this may be the most troubling aspect of
Chickasaw Nation. In the Court's opinion, these central
principles of American Indian law were reduced to
little more than rules of convenience, which, in these
cases, were apparently quite inconvenient.
For example, quoting a case that had nothing to do
with American Indian law, Justice Breyer wrote that
canons "are not mandatory rules. They are guides that
'need not be conclusive."' 56 The canon at issue in the
quoted case was ejusdem generis - a nice principle, to
be sure, but historically of far less importance than the
Indian canons. 57 If the Court thinks that all principles
called canons are created equat perhaps we need to
come up with a new term in American Indian law to
describe what for decades had been considered the law.
The Indian canons can be overcome, Justice Breyer
wrote,. by " [o ]ther circumstances evidencing congressional intent." 58 In a sense that was true even under
the traditional understanding of the canons: If congressional intent can be discerned, there's no reason for the

IV. Why Not the Indian Canons?
With the meaning of IGRA section 2719(d)(1) not at
all clear, the skirmishing between the majority and the
dissenters, outlined above, should have prepared the

48
the error might very well have been in adopting "too
restrictive a general characterization of the applicable sections." Chickasaw Nation, 122 S. Ct. at 536 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
49
ld. at 537.

sold.

51Jd.
52Jd.
53
Chickasaw Nation, 122 S. Ct. at 537 (O'Connor,

ing) (quoting 25 U.S. section 2702(1)).
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J., dissent-

54
This was an issue that attracted a great deal of attention,
particularly since the Tenth Circuit had essentially ignored the
canons. At least six amicus briefs were filed on behalf of tribes
and tribal corporations urging that effect be given to the
canons of construction. And three Connecticut towns
(Ledyard, North Stonington, and Preston) that are affectednegatively, they said - by the Foxwoods casino of the
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe filed an amicus brief arguing,
among other things, that the canons had been too broadly
appliedin the 20th century and that it was inappropriate to
apply the canons to discern congressional intent in Chickasaw
Nation.
55
22 S. Ct. at 535.
56
ld. (quoting Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105,
115 (2001)).
57
And, despite the suggestion that canons "need not be
conclusive," the Court in Circuit City applied the canon. See
Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 115.
58
Chickasaw Nation, 122 S. Ct. at 535.
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canons. It's just that Chickasaw Nation doesn't seem to
have been a case exhibiting those "other circumstances."
Besides, said the Court, the canons were developed
to interpret treaties, and they should be given less
weight in interpreting statutes. With another canon of
construction involved in interpreting IGRA section
2719(d)(l)- the canon requiring narrow construal of
exemptions from taxation - there was all the more
reason to discount the Indian canons. Facing two
canons aimed in different directions, the Court could
not "say that the pro-Indian canon is inevitably
stronger -particularly where the interpretation of a
congressional statute rather than an Indian treaty is at
issue." 59

If's not clear why Justice Breyer
badmouthed the canons. One can't
help feeling that the Court denigrated
the canons' importance because it
realized that its no-ambiguity
conclusion was difficult to swallow.
All pretty negative. And it's not clear 'Nhy Justice
Breyer badmouthed the canons when he didn't need
to. One can't help feeling that the Court denigrated the
canons' importance because it realized that its noambiguity conclusion was difficult to swallow in
Chickasaw Nation.
Consider another passage in the majority opinion:
"In this instance, to accept as conclusive the canons on
which the Tribes rely would produce an interpretation
that we conclude would conflict with the intent embodied in the statute Congress wrote." 60 At one level,
as I've already suggested, that statement is unobjectionable: If we know what Congress intended, of course
we don't need the canons. But let's remember what
"the statute Congress wrote" was. It was the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act, the purpose of which was, in
Congress's own words, "to provide a statutory basis
for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means
of promoting tribal economic development, selfsufficiency, and strong tribal governments." 61 Tribal
self-determination was the overriding goal, and, with
that in mind, how can Justice Breyer's certainty about
the taxation of tribes be well-founded?
The statute, the incomplete legislative history, the
goals of Indian policy - everything pointed toward
ambiguity, as Justice O'Connor emphasized in dissent:
"Because nothing in the text, legislative history, or underlying policies of section 2719(d) clearly resolves the
contradiction inherent in the section, it is appropriate

to turn to canons of statutory construction." 62 And, as
O'Connor wrote, "In this case, because Congress has
chosen gaming as a means of enabling the Nations to
achieve self-sufficiency, the Indian canon rightly dictates that Congress should be presumed to have intended the Nations to rec"eive more, rather than less,
revenue from this enterprise." 63
My point in this discussion isn't that the tribes
should have prevailed because the congressional intent
about tribal taxation was clear. Indeed, my point is
exactly the opposite. It's because we don't know for
sure what Congress was doing (and, for that matter,
Congress might not have known what it was doing)
that the Indian canons should have been used as a
tiebreaker. And the tie was, as Justice O'Connor put it,
"between two equally plausible (or, in this case, equally implausible) constructions of a troubled statute ....
Breaking interpretive ties is one of the least controversial uses of any canon of statutory construction." 64

B. Dueling Canons: Tax Versus Indian
The majority in Chickasaw Nation not only avoided
giving weight to the Indian canons; it also effectively
concluded that when the tax canon (construing exemptions from taxation narrowly) conflicts with the Indian
canons, it's the tax canon that should prevail. 65 The
dissenters challenged that proposition, stating that the
"Court has repeatedly held that, when these two
canons conflict, the Indian canon predominates." 66
Any conflict between the canons was more apparent
than real in Chickasaw Nation; both the majority and the
dissenters took the purported tax canon much more
seriously than it deserved to be taken. Even if it weren't
true that the Indian canons are more important - and
of course they are- the tax canon should have been
heavily discounted as it applied to Indian tribes.
Whatever the merits of the tax canon in ordinary
circumstances, and with ordinary taxpayers, it
shouldn't apply to American Indian tribes. There is no
presumption that tribes (as distinguished from tribal members) are subject to otherwise generally applicable federal
taxes. Sometimes they are, sometimes they aren't.
Sometimes Congress is specific about tribal tax
liability, sometimes it isn't. When Congress isn't
specific, it's not necessarily the case that tribes are
deemed to be taxable. With the equivocal status of
tribes under federal tax law, the Chickasaw Nation Court
should have questioned whether Congress really intended to impose the wagering taxes on tribes.
It's true that individual American Indians are subject
to federal taxes unless a specific provision in the Inter-

62
Chickasaw Nation, 122 S. Ct. at 538 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
63Jd.
64
ld. at 539 (citing William N. Eskridge Jr., et al., Legislation
and Statutory Interpretation 341 (3d ed., 2001)).
65
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
66
Chickasaw Nation, 122 S. Ct. at 538 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

59

Id. at 535-36.
Id. at 535.
61
25 U.S. section 2702(1).

60
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nal Revenue Code or treaty provides otherwiseP In
generat members of federally recognized tribes are
taxed like other American citizens. 68
It's also true that despite their sovereign status,
American Indian tribes could be taxed. (With each
taxing statute we'd have to figure nut what sort of
entity a tribe is, not necessarily an easy task, but presumably we could do that.) 69 Tribal proponents don't
like it, but it's generally conceded that Congress has
virtually unlimited power over American tribes, under
the so-called federal plenary power doctrine. That
power extends to taxation of the tribes themselves.
But to say that Congress could tax tribes isn't to say
that Congress intended to do so in a particular situation. For example, it's taken for granted today that
American Indian tribes don't pay federal income taxes,
and this exemption generally extends to tribal corpo~
rations formed under the Indian Reorganization Act as
well. 70 Someone who reads what the Chickasaw Nation
majority had to say about exemptions in tax law would
assume that Congress must have provided, somewhere
in the income tax portions of the Internal Revenue
Code, for the exemption of tribes and federally
chartered tribal corporations.
Not so. There is no specific statutory exception for tribes
or tribal corporations. 71 The modern (and now somewhat
dated) version of Felix Cohen's Handbook of American
Indian Law said simply, "Indian tribes are not taxable
entities under the income tax provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code," 72 and then cited not the code, but a
1967 Revenue Ruling (since amplified by a 1994
rulingf3 and a 1941 memorandum from the Interior

67

Sometimesspecific rules do come into play. Forexample,
section 7873 exempts from gross income the income of individual tribal members, as well as the income of tribes,
derived from "fishing-rights related activity," generally
treaty-protected or executive-order-protected fishing activity.
See Jensen, Warbus, supra note 24 (discussing section 7873).
68
See Squire v. Capoeman, 351 US. 1 (1956).
69
For example, the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Chickasaw
Nation contained a lengthy discussion about whether the
tribe was a "person" for purposes of the taxes on wagering.
See Chickasaw Nation, 208 F.3d at 878-80.
70
See Rev. Rul. 94-16, 1994-1 C.B. 19, Doc 94-2447, 94 TNT
41-8 ("Neither an unincorporated Indian tribe nor a corporation organized under section 17 of the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934 is subject to federal income tax on its income,
regardless of the location of the activities that produced the
income.").
71
There's an important distinction between tribal corporations formed under section 17 of the Indian Reorganization
Act, which are exempt from federal income taxation, and
those formed under state law, which aren't. See Rev. Rul.
94-16, 1994-1 C.B. 19 ("[A] corporation organized by an Indian tribe under state law is subject to federal income tax on
its income, regardless of the location of the activities that
produced the income.").
72
Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 390 (1982
ed.) [hereinafter Cohen].
73
See Rev. Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 C.B. 55 ("Income tax statutes
do not tax Indian tribes. The tribe is not a taxable entity."),
amplified by Rev. Rul. 94-16, 1994-1 C.B. 19, quoted in supra
notes 70-71.
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Department. 74 In 1997, Professor Scott Taylor wrote
simply, and correctly, "Tribes are generally exempt
from federal income tax. The reason for this exemption
is not altogether clear." 75
One can imagine why Congress might have decided
that sovereign tribes and their federally chartered corporations ought not to be subject to the income tax, as
a matter of first principle, but it's impossible to find
language in the Internal Revenue Code that evidences
such a decision. 76 I'm sure that Congress accepts the
proposition that a tribe (or federally chartered tribal
corporation) isn't a taxable entity under the income tax,
but it hasn't said so explicitly. Instead, Congress has
merely acquiesced in Internal Revenue Service practice.
The application of other federal taxes to tribes is less
clear. For example, tlie FICA and FUTA statutes don't
specifically mention Indian tribes, but the Service takes
the position that tribes acting as employers are required to withhold and make contributions to the FICA
and FUTA systems. 77 As Professor Taylor noted, the
Service's position on these issues - that the taxes
apply unless there's a specific exemption - is the opposite of the position it takes with the income tax. 78
Section 7871 provides that for some particular excise
taxes, tribal governments shall be treated as states/9
and the tribes might therefore be exempt from .those
taxes. Perhaps one can infer from this section that other
excise taxes, including those in chapter 35, apply to
tribes withou.t limitation. Perhaps one can infer that,

74
Memo. Sol. Int., May 1, 1941, reprinted in 1 Opinions of the
Solicitor of the Department of the Interior Relating to Indian Affairs
1917-1974, at 1044 (n.d.).
75
Scott A. Taylor, "An Introduction and Overview of Taxation and Indian Gaming," 29 Ariz. St. L.J. 251, 252 (1997).
76
Maybe, the argument might go, tribes aren't subject to
the income tax because they're not "individuals" or "estates
or trusts," and maybe they aren't "corporations." (Without
attempting a full definition, section 7701(a)(3) simply notes
that "[t]he term 'corporation' includes associations, jointstock companies, and insurance companies.") But even if a
tribe itself isn't a corporation, a tribal corporation presumably would be, and such corporations formed under the Indian Reorganization Act have also been deemed to be exempt
from the income tax. See Rev. Rul. 81-295, 1981-2 C.B. 15 ("The
federally chartered Indian tribal corporation shares the same
tax status as the Indian tribe and is not taxable on income
from activities carried on within the boundaries of the reservation."), amplified by Rev.Rul. 94-16, 1994-1 C.B. 19 (extending principle to income earned outside the reservation).
Treating a tribal corporation as equivalent to the tribe itself
clearly isn't mandated by the code's language.
77
Cohen, supra note 72, at 399; see also Ann. 2001-16,2001-8
IRB 715, Doc 2001-2897 (3 original pages), 2001 TNT 20-7
(providing guidance to tribes on FUTA obligations).
78
See Taylor, supra note 75, at 253-54; see also Robyn L.
Robinson, "A Discussion of the Application of FICA and
FUTA to Indian Tribes' On-Reservation Activities," 25 Am.
Ind. L. Rev. 37 (2000 I 2001) (questioning how the Service can
take one position with the income tax and another with FICA
and FUTA).
79
Section 7871 (a )(2 ).
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but with the mixed authority, that's all one can say:
Perhaps. 80
I hope that's enough detail to demonstrate that
trying to discern a generally applicable congressional
intent on the taxation of American Indian tribes is like
rooting for the Montreal Expos: It's a way of whiling
away the summer, but it's not going to lead to anything. The federal tax treatment of American Indian
tribes and their federally chartered corporations isn't
nearly as uniform as the Court implied in Chickasaw
Nation. If a tax "canon" emerges from all of this for
tribes- and I'm skeptical that one does- it must be
much narrower than what the Court suggested.

Trying to discern a generally
applicable congressional intent on the
taxation of American Indian tribes is
like rooting for the Montreal Expos:
It's a way of whiling away the summer,
but it's not going to lead to anything.
With this background, it wouldn't have been
surprising if Congress, in considering IGRA, had concluded that tribes wouldn't be subject to the chapter
35 taxes on wagering, without specific congressional
approval. 81 And given the extraordinary federal policy
behind IGRA - to facilitate on-reservation gambling
as a means of improving the economic self-sufficiency
of tribes - exempting the tribes from the excises and

occupational taxes of chapter 35 makes more than a
little sense.

V. Conclusion
I began this essay by hi~ting that Chickasaw Nation
might help us in deciphering statutes that make no
sense, but that's probably too lofty a goal. In an interpretive situation with no American Indian law overtones, it's hard to imagine a generally applicable
default rule to apply where statutory language points
in two diametric directions and no rule of statutory
construction provides a tiebreaker. After a court has
emptied the usual bag of tricks (plain meaning, purpose, structure, and so on), it can do little but cope. It
must decide one way or the other - the coin flip while recognizing that Congress has the power to undo
any judicial mistake. 82
But when tiebreakers based on settled doctrine are
available, a court should embrace. them. The Court in
Chickasaw Nation tried to do that with its "tax canon,"
but it gave more weight to the canon than it could bear.
And it pushed to the side a much more clearly applicable tiebreaker, the Indian canons of construction,
by adopting a cramped view of when the Indian canons
should apply. The Court concluded that Chickasaw N ation and Choctaw Nation weren't cases for the canons
because there was no ambiguity that the canons could
help resolve, and, on the facts, that was a bewildering
conclusion. I'm willing to go further: That was analmost indefensible conclusion.
82

80

See also Cohen, supra note 72, at 402-403 (discussing unclear application of excise taxes to tribes).
81
I've cited some post-1988 authority, like Revenue Ruling
94-16, in trying to determine what Congress might have been
thinking in 1988, but I don't think that's unfair. In general,
the later authority is merely an extrapolation of previously
existing understandings.
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There's no way to force, or even to strongly encourage,
Congress to deal with broken statutes. But see Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, "A Plea for Legislative Review," 60 S. Cal. L. Rev.
995, 1011-1017 (1987) (urging method to prompt "a congressional second look," something like a remand to Congress).
Given the sensitive political nature of the issues in Chickasaw
Nation, I doubt that Congress would want to revisit the issues
anyway. Changing the IGRA provision would go far beyond
what we would consider a "technical correction" in other
contexts.
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